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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate a scal common-pool problem
in a Japanese local government. Especially, we focus on the relation-
ship between council size and land development expenditure of local
government using a dataset of 13,989 municipalities in Japan from
FY2001 to FY2006. We deal with an identication of causal eects by
applying regression discontinuity design's framework to address prob-
lem of endogeneity bias. Our results show that land development ex-
penditure of small municipalities induce the scal common-pool prob-
lem over public projects.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate a scal common-pool problem in
a Japanese local government.1 Especially, we focus on the relationship be-
tween council size and land development expenditure of local government
using a dataset of 13,989 municipalities in Japan from FY2001 to FY2006.
This is because the politicians tend to propose new public projects for the
benet of their political district in any country. Also, there might be a
council members who work on behalf of specic industry groups and benet
from their eorts. If increase of the number of council member extends new
public projects such as public parks and roads, local government expendi-
ture may be increased by these project. However, expenditure of it's project
is usually funded by the national subsidy system or debt. In other words,
increase in expenditure of public project might be covered in other district's
burden.
Council and local government size are discussed by Egger and Koethen-
buerger (2010), Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) and Hirota and Yunoue(2012).The
size of government is positively related to the number of council members.
As required by law, local council size of previous study cases is a determin-
istic and discontinuous function of the municipal population size. Council
law prescribes a maximum (or minimum) limit of the council size in relation
to the population size. Particularly these studies deal with an identica-
tion of causal eects by applying regression discontinuity design's (RDD)
framework to address problem of endogeneity bias. Egger and Koethen-
buerger (2010) applied sharp RDD to Germany's municipal panel data.
Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) estimated the Finland and Sweden municipal
cases. Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) used sharp RDD in Finland and fuzzy
RDD in Sweden. However, this result showed evidence for a negative eect
of council size on government expenditure in both settings. Hirota and Yu-
noue (2012) used both sharp and fuzzy RDD in Japanese cases. They from
the full sample showed that the increase of the number of council members
causes increasing total expenditure by local government. In additionally,
they results from the discontinuity sample also showed that the average
treatment eect has a positive eect on the total expenditure around the
thresholds of 10,000 and 20,000.
This paper results indicate that the larger the size of the local council
drives the size of land development expenditure. In particular, we nd
that small municipalities tend to increase their expenditure more than large
municipalities, such that increases in local council size lead to about 4.9
percent increases of expenditure in small municipalities. Thus, our results
show that land development expenditure of small municipalities induce the
1The theory of scal common-pool problem was formalized by Weingast, Shepsle, and
Johnsen(1981). The scal common-pool problem relates to the free rider problem, pork-
barrel spending, and law of 1/n, which are all very similar phenomena.
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scal common-pool problem.
2 Local council-size law: Japanese municipalities.
We briey explain the system of the Japanese local government and council
within municipalities.2 There is a dual representation system in the Japanese
local government and local council. It means the mayor and council members
are directly elected as representative organs by voters in a public election
that is held every four years. In Japan, being a local council member is a
full-time job.
Table 1 shows the upper limit of the local council size depending on
the size of the municipal population under the law of council size (Local
Autonomy Act, Article 91). The Act prescribes a maximum council size in
relation to a municipality's population size. The number of local council
members might reach the upper limit in many cases. For example, if the
population size is less than 50,000, then the number of council members
should be at most 26 and so on. Therefore, there are 10 thresholds under
Japanese municipal law.
The data describe Japanese local government spending from FY2001
to FY2006. However, we avoid the eect of municipal mergers in Japan,
so we remove merged municipalities from our dataset. We quote the data
from Annual Accounts of Local Government and the Accounts of Local
Government in Japan. The descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2.
Figs. 1, 2 and 3 show the relationships between log expenditure and
population size. These gures also show the window size as 5, 15, and
30 percent of the population size, respectively. For example, we pick a
population size of 5,000 and a window size that is plus or minus 30 percent
around threshold. This gure shows that both relationships have a positive
correlation. According to the two regression lines, there is a discrete change
of the average value. This eect shows that the increase of the number of
council members aects local government expenditure when the population
size exceeds the 5,000 threshold. This jump shows an average treatment
eect. When the population size of the local government increases by one,
local government spending increases radically. This phenomenon, the scal
common-pool problem, is caused by the expanding council size.
3 Estimation model
We estimate the relationship between the land development expenditure of
the local government and the number of council members by the following
equation. Our estimation models follow Hirota and Yunoue (2012). First,
2This section's explanation refer to Hirota and Yunoue(2012).
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we use the sharp RDD model, which considers that the treatment variables
are non-probabilistic. The reason is that the upper limit of the Japanese
local council size is decided by the central government. The estimation
model uses sharp RDD as follows.
Yit = + Csizeit + f(xit) + Xit + i + t + it (1)
The dependent variable Yit is the land development expenditure of the ith
local government at time t.  is a constant term, and Csizeit represents the
size of the ith local council at time t as the treatment variable. We take
the logarithms of the land development expenditure and council size of the
municipality. The assignment variable is represented as f(xit) and uses the
size of the municipal population. We consider f(xit) as a smooth nonlinear
function of x. Xit denotes the control variables.
3 We also consider the
xed eect i, and time eect t. is the error term.
Second, we also consider the fuzzy RDD.
Yit = + Csizeit + Xit + i + t + it (2)
Csizeit = + !Zit + i + t +  it (3)
As mentioned earlier, the numbers of council members are only an upper
limit depending on the size of the population of the municipality. It is not
always true that all municipalities use upper limits on the number of local
council members, because the council size law prescribes a maximum limit
of council size in relation to the population size. This model assumes that
the size of the local councils is a probabilistic discontinuous variable at the
thresholds. Discontinuity is highly correlated with treatment. We employ
the instrumental variables (IV) estimation. We estimate this model with
population size as an instrumental variable (Zit).
4 Estimation results
We estimate the equations for the full sample, which include every threshold,
and the equations for the discontinuity sample, which show the window size
as 5 percent, 15 percent, and 30 percent of the population size, respectively.
In all estimation results, the coecient of the council size is positive. These
3We control for the per capita wage, rate of the daytime population, rate of the pop-
ulation under 15, rate of the population over 65, and population size, because these are
considered to be a dataset of control variables in the empirical literature on estimates of
local government expenditure.
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estimation results cover various statistical problems that previous research
could not deal with.
The results using the full sample are reported in Table 3. Columns (1)
and (2) show the results of Pooling OLS. Both results show the positive
eects of local council size. Moreover, columns (3) and (4) represent the
results of the xed eect estimation. The results of sharp RDD are reported
in columns (5) to (8). The estimated value of council size becomes much
smaller than previous results. Of note, we consider the eect of assignment
variables in these estimations. While the LR test of between the fourth and
third degree polynomials is insignicant, the test between the fourth and
second degree is signicant. Similarly, the LR test between the fourth and
rst degrees is signicant. As a result, column (7) shows the council size
eect is 0.13.
The estimation results of fuzzy RDD are reported in column (9). We
check the specication of the model by using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.
This test shows that the fuzzy RDD specication is plausible. The estimated
value is positively signicant and this result shows that if the number of
council members is marginally increased, then expenditure will increase. In
other words, the increase of the local council size leads to about a 2.40
percent increase of expenditure by municipalities. Conclusively, the positive
council size eect is supported by evidence from fuzzy RDD.
As a robustness check, we also consider the local eect of the number
of local council members. It is necessary to check what happens in each
threshold. Table 4 shows that the threshold is 20,000. We set the window
size at a 30 percent of cuto population. These results are similar to previous
results and the fuzzy RDD (column 9) is the most plausible. The estimated
value of the size of the local councils is 4.91. As a result, the discontinuity
sample shows similar ndings to the full sample estimation model.
5 Conclusion
Our results from the full sample show that the increase of the number of
council members causes increasing land development expenditure by local
government. This result supports the results of Egger and Koethenbuerger
(2010) and Hirota and Yunoue (2012). Our results also from the disconti-
nuity sample show that the average treatment has a positive eect on the
expenditure around the thresholds of 20,000. According to our estimation,
the main source of common-pool problem on Japanese local public nance
is originated the expenditure of land development. These results imply
that relatively smaller governments face the scal common-pool problem in
Japanese local government over public projects.
5
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Table 1: Local council-size law: Japanese municipalities.
City Town and village
Population size Number of council members Population size Number of council members
-50,000 26 -2,000 12
50,000-100,000 30 2,000-5,000 14
100,000-200,000 34 5,000-10,000 18
200,000-300,000 38 10,000-20,000 22
300,000-500,000 46 20,000- 26
500,000-900,000 56
900,000- 56-96
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics.
Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Land development Expenditure(thousand yen) 2756848.00 14100000.00 11291.00 472000000.00
Council size 15.96 7.29 4.00 93.00
Population size 40840.70 139679.70 211.00 3562983.00
Per capita wage 6007.91 661.83 2496.07 10368.99
The rate of daytime population 0.94 0.24 0.57 22.59
The rate of population under 15 0.14 0.03 0.05 2.86
The rate of population over 65 0.24 0.09 0.07 6.33
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Figure 1: Log land development expenditure and population around a
threshold window of 5 percent
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Figure 2: Log land development expenditure and population around a
threshold window of 15 percent
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Figure 3: Log land development expenditure and population around a
threshold window of 30 percent
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